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The  Kennedy ·round  must  lead  to  uorld-vide  co-ordination  of 
acricultural  policies 
On  4 May  the  Kennedy  round  opened  officially in Geneva.  This 
session  of  the  G11.TT  'l'rade  N  cgotia  tions  Corntai ttce  .:c,s  n. t tended  by 
forty-tvo  contractin~ nartios  and  tvelve aosociated countries. 
The  six member  countries  of  the  European  ~conomic Community 
are  taking part as  an  entity,  the  Council  of  f1inistero  having  inotructed 
the  Commission  to  negotiate  on  hehalf  of  the  Community. 
The  origins  of  the  meeting  in  Geneva  go  back  to  July  1962,  when 
the  United  States  Congress  pnsoed  the  Trade  Expanoion Act  at  the 
instance  of President Kennedy.  This  adoption  by  the  USA  of a  programme 
empo\rering its Government  to  negotiate  reciprocal  tariff cuts  or  the 
elimination  of  dutieo  uith  the  European  Economic  Community  is  one  of 
the  most  spectacular achievements  of  t!1e  Common  Market.  For  in this 
vmy  the  United  States recogni zcs  the  Common  Harket  ns  a  partner of  such 
stature  that it liishcs  to  discuss  mutual  relations,  and  the  tasks 
facing  them  both  in  the  '.JOrld,  on  an  equal  footing. 
The  BEC  Commission  welcomed  the  American  initiative,  particularly 
since it gives  the  Community  furtllr;r  possihili ties  - folloHing  the 
breakdo1m  of  negotiations  ~ith  the  United  Kingdom  and  its consequences 
on  relations  with non-wcmbar  countries  in  ~urope - for  regulating  trade 
relations  ui th  thOfle  countrios  in  a  more  positive  manner.  It also 
provides  tho  United  Stu. tos  .:end  tho  Communi t;y  ':i th  a  basis  for  joint 
responnibility  to•~rds  tho  developing  countries. 
Tho  partn( rship  liatlrc8n  the  tv;o  big  economic  units  of  the  \lest 
is  therefore called  u~on not  only  to  forge  nov  trade  links  between 
the  United  Stc,tes  and  an  omorc;int;  Europe  but  also  to  make  tho  greatest 
effort  touards  li  bcrali  ::;at ion  of  \rorld  trade  that  has  boon  attempted 
for  a  lone  time,  in  order  to  strengthon  the  economic  structure  of  the 
free  uorld.  The  Trade  Expansion  Act  makes  it possihlo  to  abandon  the 
traditional  GATT  practice  of  item-by-item nogoti2tion  in  favour  of 
::tcross-the-board  r<1duction  of  tariffs  on  industrial  and  agricultural 
products  by  n  maximum  of  50){;  c'-"  .:c  ';oneraJ.  rule.  HoHGVccr,  this  c-eneral 
rule uill not  n.~1pl~,  to  r:.'~ricu.l tural  products  if  tho  agreement  reached 
f~vours American  exporto,  nor  to  tropical  products  if tl1o  Community 
abolishes  duties  on  them. 
'l'ho  Act  is  clcurl:y  based  on  the  assumption  that  tht;  European 
Community  'Jould  be  anL:rgod  to  include,  in rmrticul.:J.r,  the  United 
Kingdom,  und it alno  provides  for  thu  total abolition of  duties  on 
products  for  \rhich  the  USA  and  the  CommuniL;:.r  account  for at least 
so;;  of  •,rorld  exports.  'l'his  clause  is  of  no  further  fJit_;nificance  since 
tho  only  i toms  to  roach  that  fir,uro  arc  rnrngarint~  and  aircraft  • 
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At  tho  mooting  of  GATT  Ministers  in May  1963,  \iliich  examined  the 
main  provisions  of  the  Act  in order  to  ascertain whether  they would 
promote  free  trade  in  the  ·,rorld,  tho  ~EC Commission  took  tho  opportun-
ity to  havEJ  tho  scope  of  tho  nr\r;otin tions  extended  to  cover  the 
automatic  reduction of  tariff disparities  as  .roll  as  1inoar cuts. 
The  LTini .stare  agreed  "that  the  trade  no go tic:. tions  shall  cover 
all kinds  of  products,  industrial and  non-industrial,  including 
agricultural  and  primary  prouuctn",  and  "that  tlw  rrrade  Nc·eotiations 
Commi tteo  shall  deal  inter alia '.Ii th  •••  tho  rules  to  govJrn,  and  the 
mr:thods  to  be employed  in,  tho  creation of acceptable  conditions  of 
access  to  ·.rorld  m.:trkc~ts  for agricultural  products  in furtherance  of  a 
significant  dovolopm.:•nt  nnd  expansion  of '.rorld  trade  in  such  products." 
In May  1963  the  EEC  Council  stated that none  of  the  clements 
likely  to  affect  the  balance  of  vorld agricultural  markets  should 
be  excluded  from  tho  nogoti::.tions  '.!i thout  discussion. 
The  EEC  anprovcd  the  conclusions  of  tho  GATT  ministerial  resolution 
and  in February  196L1-,  on  tho  basic  of  this  resolution  and  of its o1m 
statement,  submitted its negotiating plan  for  the  agricultural  part 
of  the  Kennedy  round  to  tho  contracting parties. 
This  plan is  based  on  the  idea  that  tho  traditional  tariff approach 
is  now  inadequate  for  n~goti tions  conc2rnod vith  farm  products.  In 
any  case,  a~riculturo had  bnen  practically  excluded  from  tariff 
negotiations  in  tho  past.  11hon  tho  G<;n(::ral  Agreement  ~nts  drawn  up  in 
1948,  practically identical provisions  rerc  mndo  for  a~ricultural and 
industrial  products,  s inca  the  situation at  the. t  time  ·.ms  charactori  zed 
by  shortage  of  food  supplies  and  bu.Lmcc-of-paymonts  difficulties. 
While  thu  tuxt  of  the  Gcnoral  hgreom0nt  )Jrovided  for  tho  elimination 
of all barriers  to  trade,  especially quantitative restrictions,  tho 
lattor wore  nevertheless  p1·rrnittod  under  certain circumstances:  and 
tho  Uni tcocl  St~ctoD  i tnolf  had  frorluont  recourse  to  them  nhrm its  O\m 
agriculture needed protection. 
In present  conditione,  no;;  solutions  nro  nooclod  to  ensure  that 
\JOrld  traclo  in ar,ri cultural  products  can  re[~lly be  organized.  'rho  EEC 
considers  Lhat  tho  nDtional  L~rm policies  of  tho  importing and  exporting 
countries  arc  decisive  in  organi~ing  trade  in  farm  products,  and  that 
the  fundamental  and  typical  olt.Jmcnt  common  to  nearly all  the  contro.cting 
partic:S  is  the  SUpport  giV\)n  to  HljTiculturo. 
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The  Community  therefore:  suGgests  that  a  level  of  support  be 
negotiated and  bound.  Tho  nq;otiations  Hill  consequently  cover not  only 
protection at  th()  frontier  but  o.lso  ngriculturn.l  and  comm<Jrcial  policies. 
The  level  of  support  is  equnl  to  tho  difference  bct~ccn the  reference 
price  on  the  ·;rorld  market  and  the  price  obtained  by  the  pro ducor.  This 
bound  support  luvol  ropresc:nts  tho  overall  effect  of  tho  vo.rious  instru-
mon ts  of  support  - customs  duties,  qurmti to. ti  vo  restrictions,  etc.  -
on  tho  conditions  of  production  n.nd  trade,  und  docs  not affect  the 
instruments  thcmsclvos.  If for  a  givJn  product  the  customs  duty is  the 
only instrument utilized,  thifJ  duty affords  a  certain amount  of support 
for  the  product  in  the  importing  country,  and  the  level  of  support  then 
corresponds  to  tho  incidence  of  the:  customs  duty  on  tho  refore:nce  price. 
Tho  support-level  method  docs  not  autom~tically call in question any 
customs  duty  bound  during previous  negotiations.  If there  arc  other 
instruments  of  support,  the  bound.  customs  duty  is still applied as  an 
element  bindin~ the  level  of  support. 
At  all cvcntf;,  if o.  contro.ctinr, party  .. rishos  to rovcrtto  an  earlier 
tariff  bindin~, it may  unbind  tho  support  level  provided  GATT 1s  normal 
compensation rules  arc:  complied  iri th. 
rrhe  value  of  binding \Till  d<?JHmd  in the first place  on  .rhothor  tho 
country doing it ho.s  fixc"d  its maximum  level  n. t  n  fir,ure  roprN1enting 
n  fair  compromise  bGtvoon  tho  r8al  intorosts of  the  countries  benefiting 
from  tho  bindine.  Furthermore,  i'or  thos(}  countries  the  binding of 
a  maximum  amount  una.blcs  tho  concli tionn  of  u.ccoss  to  their  import  markets 
to  bo  defined  more  cll:arly.  'rrlis  ·.rill  p::rmi t  exporters  to  framn  export 
policy  n.nd  production  policy  ·.~i thout  risk tlwt  their efforts  might  bo 
invalidn.tad  by  importing  countries  suddenly  changing  their measures  of 
support.  In  bind.inc;  i  t,s  o  rn  L;Vl11  of  support,  tho  T;EC  loses  some  of 
its  freedom  of action  n.nd  restricts its  scope  for  incrcn.sing levies at 
,;rill  in  the~  future.  '.I'hc  ESC  L>  ~.t,rc'trc~  of  tho  need  to  incru2.sc  production 
~ithin reasonable  limits  only.  As  tho  biggest  ~orld importer,  tho 
Community  is  thus  sho·.linc;  its  S<jnGl)  of rasponsi  oi li  ty  to·u::.rcl.s  d~~porting 
countries.  Moreover,  no  negotiations  r£lnting solely  to  t1triff protec-
tion  could.  produce  r>..n;ything  but  short-t--rm solutions  as  regards  trade 
in farm products.  So  tho  vary  hanrt  of  fnrm  policy  - all  tho  measures  of 
protection utilizc;d  - ·:rill  hrwo  to  0(1  t[ckon  into  consideration  to  produce 
the  essential  solution  by  n  first  1najor  measure:  tha  bindinG  of  support 
at  a  certain level. 
As  for  dcfini tion  of  th<.c:  a<>;ricul  tur,~l  sc•ctor,  tho  Community  believes 
it essential  to  tn.k:;  account  of  tho  connection  bc;t\;oon  agricultural 
products  and  those  of  tho  agricultural  food  industr~',  in  order  to  prevent 
distortion of  competition  that  mi~ht be  detrimental  to  production of 
and  trade  in procccr:od  products.  There  is,  then,  0c  need  to  agrou  n.s 
rapidly as  possible  on  1rhn.t  constitutus  the aericultural  sector.  ~During 
tho  pre-p:1.rn tory n(?gotia tions it \ms  agreed  that  the  products  in  the 
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first  twenty-four  ch~ptors of  tho  Brussuls  Nomunclnture  should  form 
the  1rorking  bnsis  for  tho  currlmt  c:to.go.  Ho·,roVL~r,  tho  m::ctter  will 
hnve  to  bl:  studied in  {';Tenter  detail  before  1rc  h£lvc  n  lL:t  of  the 
products  comprised  in  tho  ngriculturnl  sector.  For  prQcticnl  determin-
ation  of  tho  lcvc)l  of  support,  the  contracting parties must  themselves 
submit  thr1  figures  rcla  tinr;  to  tlloir vrtrious  products.  '.i'his  implies 
that  the  method  of  dat,:;rmino.tion  must  be  nppliod  in  tho  same  •ray  for 
all  conc.~rnod,  and  mu~t  onabl,;  the;  contracting parties  to  justify 
the  results  submitted.  An  o.rbitrntion procedure  should  ba  not  up  in 
cnso  of dispute. 
Since  the  level  of  support  is  tho  difference  botvaon  the  roforcncc 
price and  the  producers'  price  in  o.  given  country,  those  two  terms 
must  be  dofinad. 
Tho  r2faranco  price  mny  be  either u  price  derived  from  the  nvorage 
sellinr; price  on  th.:;  \rorld  marb:t  or  frae-n.t-frontir~r during a  refcr<Jncc 
period,  or  a  price negotiated  botvecn  tho  contracting pnrtios  con-
cerned  \!hera  tho  derived prices  provo  inndoquato.  Tho  price  obtained 
by  produccro  on  the  homo  m.-::rkc·t  is  tho  annual  price  r.~~ccivc.:d  at  tho 
farm  for nll  qualitieo  sold,  pluo,  \rhorc  npproprinta,  direct  subsidies 
to  the  product  in quaotion.  Both  theoe  olamantn  will  have  to  be 
adjusted,  houovor,  to  tnko  into  account  differences  in quality or  to 
bring pro<lucts  to  comyJn.rablc:  c>t~tf,'OG  in  rr:n.rkutinf,'.  In  tho  cnso  of  i toms 
processed  from  b::tSic  products,  Et{!racmont  Hill  h~wo to  be  ranched  on 
sufficiently roprasuntntivo  conv0rsion  fnctoro.  It mny  sometimes  seem 
difficult  to  o.scortain  the  r,,f:·!rencu  price  n.nd  tho  producer  price 
exactly;  in  this  c:::.sc  it ·;rould  bu  poosiblo  to  settle for  an  approximate 
nsso::Jsmcnt  from  thu  ll!Oc;t  suitrcblc  clatr1  o.vail~1ble. 
For  a  fNr  r,;sidu[l.l  Lorrn  products,  the  F.EC  might  n.r~roo  to  go  back 
to  traditional  m~thocls  of  tariff  n~goti :tion  - chiJfly for  products 
playin,; a  n,;r;lici  bl·.:  p. 'rt in in  t.crn:t ti  onnl  trcda,  but  also  '.rhora 
tochnicnl  difficulties  in  a!1~lyin~  tho  method  of  support-level  binding 
provo  insurmountable. 
This,  in  ~roncl outlina,  is  tho  standpoint  of  the  ~uroponn ~conomic 
Community  :ct  U10  curn,nt  .iL~CJ  oi  prupnrntory  rork  for  tlw  ncricultural 
part  of  tho  Kennedy  round. 
Tho  f,'oncral  o.ttituclo  of  tho  United  3tn.tos  ~t prasont is  that 
lLgricultural  products  should  bo  accorded  treatment  similar  to  that of 
industrial  1)rocluctn  by utilizin,;  'rhurc~ver possible  tho  formula  of 
general  across-tho-board  cuts  proposed  by  the  American  Government. 
\Thoro  thc,ro  aro  mcasuros  other  th:m  fixed  cur; toms  clu tics affocting trade, 
tho  aim  ohould  bo  to  n(;r,ot:i.:·Ltc  rcductionr;  com.pcnnblo  \lith  the  acroso-thc-
board cuts  appliod  to  othur products. 
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Given  these  hro  ,•·:c:ncr~cl  posi  tj_onrl,  sov~:retl  doL:  get tions  SU(Sgestod 
th:tt  the  vmy  to  carry  em  those  nor,otiations  should  emerlj8  if Hhat  they 
call  et  "pragr:m.tic"  ::::.p}l:ro~:cch  to  the  probloms  nere  adoptc:d.  They  propose 
th~1t  an  oxamin::tion  should  be  mn,uu  of  flo-.Ts  of  tretuo,  of  tho  nnturo  of 
the  products  nnd  of  the  types  of protection  employed,  so  ns  to  provide 
tho  clemc!n ts  nocdc~ti  for  vvorking  out  methods  for  ncgo tinting reductions 
in  obst8.clcs  to  trn.cl(;  th8.t  '.Jill  c.ccord  ·.ri th needs  and  \Fi th the  circum-
stances  of  each  croup  of products.  'l'hoy  con~;idur that  cu~;toms  duties 
nro  the  solo  m8.jor  restriction  on  moot  trade  in  fnrm  products.  The 
objc"ctivc!S  in vic\1  ffifl.J  be)  8.ttn.incd  throu[jh  nc:gotirLtions  for  cuttinr, 
n.nd  binding  these  duties.  The  countries  concerned  should  therefore 
offer  to  lover  thoir duties,  lon.ving  open  tho possibility of  50%  cuts 
in anpropria  to  cases.  Coun trios  applyi nc  othc~r  typos  of rt:striction, 
togethc:r  iri th or  ins  tend  of  fixed  customs  clu tics,  should  <1grco  to 
equivalent  roductions  and  bindings  on  their restrictions  on  tr<:1de. 
Lastly,  in  cG.ses  uhi:ro  customs  duties  ::.;,rc  gonorn.lly  2.ccompr.tniod  by 
othor controls  n.t  tho  frontier,  whore  cuotoms  duties  arc  not  tho  main 
obstacles  to  trade,  and  11hcre  domestic  policies also  plny  nn  important 
part  in  determining ncccso  to  tho  market,  the  negotintions  should 
nlso  covnr  such  measures, 
Those  delegations  sur;cost  th.'.'.t  anch  country  mn.ke  offors  con-
sistent  ~ith tho  measures  of  protection and  support it applies  for 
particular productn  or  groupo  of  products  ·end  that  those  off12rs  bo 
put  fonrard  on  10  S1:ptember  1964  at  the  same  time  as  tho  lists  of 
exceptions.  The  productG  on  those  ln.st-namod  lists  ~ould not  be  tho 
subject  of offers, 
The  Community  be  1 i eves  that  the;  nc;t  result  of  such  a  pragmatic 
approC\.ch  \could  be-;  to  r;iv:;  the  contncct~nc p[',rties  rtdvocatine it 
substantiG.l  conc2ssions  from  importing countries  (pn.rticul~rly tho 
.CBC  .~nd  GrGa  t  Dri  to. in)  ·ri thout  ~:nsuring tho  rue iproc  i ty of  commit-
ments  and  tho  baln.ncc  of  nclvn.nt.'CgcJs  \rhich  .:'.re,  n.ftc.-r  all,  of basic 
importance  in  th:::;s,;  nc·goti~'  tions, 
It should  be  point~d out  t~Lt tho  suggestions  put  forvard  by 
those  dclugations  do  not  relate  to  products  cominr; undor  international 
commodity  nrrn.ng"monts,  :c;uch  as  c..:ruals,  mc::tts  n.nd  cln.iry  products. 
Tho  ~hy 1963  resolution  of  GATT  llinistors  specified that  the 
rulcs  laid  clo•m  for  tho  nc[;oti:'Ltion  of acricul tural  products  in 
c;onoral  should  bt;  oxtc:1.clod  for  cort<>.in  proclucts  ~;o  rrs  to  produce 
uorld-uidu  agroorrwnts.  In its nr:gotia tine;  pl::m,  tho  EEC  suggested 
th:o.t  thc'sc  n.gn-,cmcnt~'  :1houlc1  cover  Jlroclucts  occupying  n.n  important 
plc.co  in  int..;rnn. t:Lono.l  tr<tdu  nnd  for  vhich  pcrm::tnont  imh<::.lEtnco 
betueen  sup_ply  :end  dnmand  is  cliscorn:Lbl0  or  may  be  expected in the 
short  torm.  Tho  EEC  montionod  ~hont nnd  co8.rse  grn.ins,  bcof  nnd  vo<ll, 
certain  d<:1iry  products,  oug0.r,  and  purhaps  oil  soods  and  oleaginous / 
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fruits,  though  this  li!:.;t  is  in no  irr,y  restrictive.  Thos•.?  ac-reomcnts 
uould  consti  tuto  ~  l:ind  of  supc:rstructure  in :rolo.tion  to  tho  g.::noral 
rules  for  tho  n:.cgotio.tion~;  on  ar:rlcul turn.l  products  n.nd  should lend 
to  very  extensive  multil:.t\:r~tl  co-op  :r~~.tion  ·.:ith  ct  vi;)v;  to  stn,bilizing 
world  m~rkot prices  nt  a  fair  and  remunerative  level,  striking a 
long-term balance  between  production  nnd  do@and,  nnd  eliminating short-
term  fluctur~tions.  Thesl;  ncroomonts  ·;rould.  be  distinguished  from  those 
nou  in  fore e  - parti  cul£' rly  the  uhoa  t  ngroornen  t  - by  mn.king  the 
rQfercmcc  price  tho  koy  to  the  ~3ystolil,  Hh<::roc,s  at  present  tho  concGpt 
of  quotas  is  more  central  thnn  thnt  of  pric<:S. 
In  futuro  Horld  ngruomcnts  the  r::foroncu  price uould  be  both 
n  ktlancing  olamon t  in  trade  and  a  long-term  guide.  In  most  casos  it 
will  be  n  negotiated prico. 
Furthor ohligntions  might  be  specified  - especially something  to 
make  producing  countries  tn.kcc  stops  to  pruvont  further  surpluses  from 
building up.  If mora  food,  and  n  gro~tor variety  of  food,  nrc  to  be 
sent  to  help  tho  developing countries  in future,  theso  countries  should 
not  be  considered  dumping  grounds  for  surplus  production  - particularly 
as  this  uould  put  n  brake  on  tho  development  of  th~ir domestic  agri-
cultural  production. 
In  conclusion,  lt:t us  outline  hou  work  on  tho  Kennedy  round  is 
o.. t  present  org::mi zccl  in  GATT. 
The  Tr~de Nocotiations  Committee  is  in charge  of  tho  overall 
preparation  of  tho  nogotintions.  As  roco..rds  agricultural negotiations, 
the  Committee  on  Agriculture  reports  to  tho  Trndc  Negotiations  Com-
mittee  on  progress  made  and,  vhera appropriate,  submits  the  recommend-
ations  on  \rhich  ~gracmcnt hns  bean  reached.  The  Committee  on Agriculture 
has  n  tachnicnl  sub-committee;  and  a  number  of  Spacial  Groups  - in 
particular on  caranls,  rnuqt,  and  dniry  products  - arc  contributing  to 
the  prcparntion of ncgotL!.tions  concerninG  thosu  St'Ctor8,  + 
+  Tho  pro~ress of  negotiations  for  ngroomcnts  on  these  products 
vill  bo  rc)portod  in  .'1.  future  issue  of  this  Bulletin. - 8  .. 
Tables  on  EEC  fo.rm  imports 
Tho  following  to.blc~s  sho'il  tho  (lo...-clopment  of  EEC  iml)Orts  of 
ngriculturnl products  (including bnsic  products)  butwoon  1958  nnd 
September  1963. 
Source 
Community  countrios 
Non-member  countries 
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1959  1960 
(  ~t> 
tt:l  million) 
589  848 
7  380  8  319 
4  513  4  652 
Lq4  55lt 
977  312 
2~ 3  349 
196'1  1962  % 
chanGo 
1958-62 
2  041  2  318  +  82.6 
8  404  9  04FJ  +  21.6 
4  l~9 3  l~  973  + 12.6 
567  606  +  63 .o 
371  382  +  44.1 
278  •J  535  +  30.6 
b)  !~r~~!~-~f_r~~~~~!~-~~~J~~!_!~-Q~~~~~!!~-!~~~!:!!99~-{~~~9~!~1 
E!§~~~!l_E~~!!!~l-9IT0~1-f!~~!l_!~~~!~~!~~l-~~~~2 
195R  1959  1960  •J961  •J962  % 
Source  chcmgo 
($  million)  1)58-G2 
Community  countries  1 +72  558  6l~4  728  '794  +  68 
Non-membc~r countrios  6R4  589  670  83R  2  083  +  2lt 
State-tr2..ding  countriec1  98  137  no  -qit- 1it2  +  l~5 
USA  228  319  30fl  454  509  +123 




1  893 








( 1 )  Non-Communist  countrius  outoida  £uropo  \rhos~  exports  arc still mora 
tho.n  50/b  ngricu1 turn.l 1  i.  <:.  otlwr  th;-m  USA,  Cn.m~dc.  D.nd  Jrcpan • 
•  I  .. ;  I>  f'. - 9  -









Austral  in. 
USSR 
Food  r,rnins 















1958  1960  1962 
2~4  300 
52  465 
109  991 
27  713 
1  579 
144  B'+O 
117  01 +-5 
1 3  981 
3  3ti7 
35  813 
29  773 
2  796 
R  5h2 
6  551 
5  597 
2  257 
(thousand~ of  $) 
239  768  365  530 
L1-5  231  76  332 
113  199  123  317 
28  588  81  277 
7  967 
22  260 
28  528 
16  120 . 
541  020  727  817 
221  088  351  523 
1  6 3  /1-51  1 6 5  9 9 j 
31 +- o1•o  29  099 
9  992  R 380 
3  R59  ~1  671 
60  859 
22  207 
20  342 
7  lf67 
5  Ita 8 
91 f 9 
96  519 
52  379 
27  035 
6  685 
5  907 
1  360 
% change 
1958-62 
+  Lt-9. 6 
+  11-5.3 
+  12 '1 
+  193 
+  921 
+  71 
+  143 
+  ~-2 
+  108. 1 
+  147.4 
+  16.3 
+  224 
+177]; 
+  316 
+  2 




162  549 
32  004 
509  200 
262  000 
36  732 
14  177 
...  I ... - 10  -
"\ 
) 
1958  1960  1962  % change  1963 
Source  195f"l-62  Jan.-Sept. 
(thousc.nds  of  $  ) 
Citrus  fruits 
TotCtl  non-member 
countries  21~1  715  234  466  287  939  +  1  9. 1  184  690 
USA  14  558  10  160  1  LJ- 737  +  1.2  9  270 
Spain  97  089  94  1  55  119  612  +  23. 1 
Algeria,  l.lorocco, 
Tunisia  92  117  86  691  107  239  +  16.4 
Israel  14  263  17  337  17  47 1t  +  22.5 
South Africa  9  686  1  5  226  17  200  +  77·5 
Bro,zil  6  705  6  894  7  887  +  17.6 
Fruit  ,juice  and 
vcgcJtables 
Tot:l.l  non-r.wmbcr 
countries  1  5  601  16  7 1~5  24  203  +  55.1  22  300 
USA  7  376  6  91~8  9  620  +  30.4  6  000 
Alguria,  llorocco, 
'runisi8.  3  590  3  227  ~~  761  +  32.6 
Israel  898  2  293  2  606  +190.2 
Spain  730  7  51  1  515  +101.5 
Yur,oslavin  317  LW7  877  +176.6 
South Africn.  181  100  641  +2511-.1 
Tobacco 
Total  non-mc;mbor 
countricB  207  )27  207  l~l+ 7  283  486  +  36.7  207  829 
USA  74  170  83  627  106  599  + 43.7  78  550 
Grl:oco  35  235  29  454  38  668  +  9.7 
Turkey  1  5  756  10  812  23  161  +  L~6 • 9 
Hhodesin.  o.nd 
Nyasnland  6  014  13  212  22  946  +236.7 
Indonc;sin  22  7~6  17  7)LI- 20  o4o  - 11 . 8 
Brazil  10  000  9  )33  16  196  +  38.2 
ft  •• I ... ··----- ·--
'; 958  1960  1962  % change  1963 
Source  1958-62  JEm, -Sept. 
( thousconds  of  ~··)  qi\ 
,..,~ >  ....  Cotton 
\ 
l 
Total  non-member 
countries  t;l+9  538  739  599  622  197  4.2 
USA  264  780  334  590  139  5
1 ~ 3  L~ 7 • 2 
I>.Ioxico  57  810  52  008  77  606  +  34.2 
l3ra zi  l  9  6  31  24  622  56  959  +  491  .I!-
r_rurkuy  1  5  l1-00  51  071  118  087  +  212.2 
Pc:ru  )8  632  33  121  39  420  +  2.7 
Sudan  20  599  25  033  38  30~- +  85.9 
Egypt  34  126  52  361  33  893  0.6 
Syria  22  998  26  231  23  269  +  1 • 1 
Gr,;ec c  9  286  9  394  14  175  +  52.6 
Oil  soc"cls  and  o 1 ertgi  no us  fruits 
Total  non-member 
countries  471  :;47  560  +  18.8  439 
USA  88.('1  149.7  19R-.8  +  123 
Asoocif'.tucl 
African  countries  140  101  105  25 
Other  clovc~lopinG 
•1 
countries  178  225  212  +  1  9. 1 
Sta  to-trr<.cling  countrL:s  21  50  17  19 
Ver;utablo  oils 
Total  non-meJmbor 
countries  229  300  258  +  12.6  243 
USA  36.8  11-9 • 1  13.7  62.7 
},ssociatocl 
African countries  86  83  81  5. 1 
LL'-tin  Amorica  33  LJ-3  52  +  57.5 
St.:>. tc-tr:ulinG 
countries  8  1  7  1  5  +  87-5 
RicQ 
~'otal  non-member 
~ 
countries  3)  36  45  +  )6.3 
USA  2.5  7·5  1  LJ-, 8  +  /_~92 
Par  Bast  HJ. 5  18.6  17.6  4.8 
Ln. tin Lmcricn  0.6  0.2  4.R  +  700 
Er~ypt  1.1  0  <'; 